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17144 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE July 21, 1965 
THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the 
situation in Viet Nam, in the words of 
President Johnson, Secretary McNamara 
and others, is likely to get worse before 
it gets better. What the Secretary will 
report to the President as a result of his 
week in Viet Nam is, of course, not 
known; but it appears that the ground-
work has been laid for a further intensi-
fication of the military effort in Viet 
Nam. Obviously, if this continues the 
American presence is going to assume 
the predominant role in that conflict. 
There is talk of a reserve call up, ex-
tended enlistments, added defense ap-
propriations and the like. It is even 
anticipated on our side that the war may 
go on for 4 or 5 or even 10 years and Ho 
Chi Mh;th, President of North Viet Nam, 
has stated in the last day or so that he 
is prepared for a war of 20 years dura-
tion. 
It is interesting to note and not sur-
prising that what is occurring in Viet 
Nam is now being caled "an American 
war" by one columnist and another col-
umnist states that in South Viet Nam : 
"It is real war there at last." 
The President has gone down many 
tracks in an effort to enter into "un-
conditional discussions" to pave the way 
for negotiations which might end the 
hostilities in VietNam. He has met with 
silence or rebuffs at every turn. U Thant 
has endeavored in a quiet way to use the 
facllities of the United Nations. A pro-
posed Commonwealth Group which 
would go to Moscow, Peking, Hanoi and 
Washington has ben advocated and re-
buffed. A representative of the British 
Government has gone to Hanoi. Mr. 
Mr. Harriman has gone to Moscow ; all 
with no success . 
It is my understanding that in the im-
mediate past Ho Chi Minh has extended 
an invitation to President Nkrumah of 
Ghana to come to Hanoi but instead of 
Mr. Nkrumah going, he is sending 
Ghana's High Commissioner in London. 
A glimmer but only a glimmer of hope 
may come out of this meeting. 
It is of interest, I think, to the Ameri-
can people to note the comments of Gen-
eral Nguyen Cao Ky, the present premier 
of South Viet Nam-one of a long line--
in a recent TV program with Walter 
Cronkite. I do not have the complete 
copy of the interview but I am inserting 
at the conclusion of my remarks an arti-
cle by one of the most competent foreign 
policy analysts in the nation, Mr. R. H . 
Shackford of the Washington Daily 
News. 
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that that be allowed. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without 
objection, it is so ordered. 
<See exhibit U 
Mr. MANSFIELD. It does not make 
very reassuring reading. And if there 
is any complacency on the part of any 
American, it ought to be dispelled by 
an exposure to Premier Ky's comments. 
What I have stated are grim facts. 
What the situation in Viet Nam con-
fronts us with, however, is a grhn fact. 
It is better to face up to this problem 
than to ignore it in the belief that it 
will wash away at the end of the Mon-
soons. The thne for wishful thinking 
is past; the time for accepting the reality 
is now. Indeed it has been time for 
quite awhile. We are in, not for a sum-
mer of pain and difficulty but for an 
ordeal of indefinite duration and in-
creasing sacrifice which will persist until 
the problem can be resolved at the 
Conference table. 
Our policies so far have been mostly 
in the nature of holding operations, 
except for forays of our bombers over 
Viet Nam. The air raids have appar-
ently failed to stop the infiltration of 
regular and irregular North Vietnamese 
units into South Viet Nam but instead, 
in my opinion, have har(iened the posi-
tion of the government and the people 
of the North and increased their com-
mitment to this war. As evidence 
thereof, the estimates of the number of 
active armed Viet Cong has risen sharply 
since the beginning of the year, despite 
their reported severe losses. 
As the war in Viet Nam increases in 
tempo, we should keep in mind the pos-
sibilities of Communist pressure against 
us in other parts of Asia and perhaps 
other parts of the world. I have in mind 
the uneasy truce which exists in Korea; 
the possibility of operations against 
Thailand and Laos and elsewhere. 
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At the moment the Soviet Union is 
fum1shing a certain amount of assist-
ance. The Chinese are providing some 
material aid to North VIetNam although 
to the best of our knowledge no Chinese 
personnel have as yet entered the con-
nlct. But 1l the war continues to es-
calate, Peking, Moscow and Hanoi wUI 
continue to Le drawn more closely to-
gether despite any ideological or other 
C:it!'erences which at the present time 
may exist. 
As I see It, the chief beneficiary of 
what ls going on In Southeast Asia at 
the present time 1s Mainland China. 
The Chinese are benefiting from events 
there at little cost and with little sweat. 
Chinese governments have long been 
adept at exercising the virtue of patience 
which they have In abundance. They 
can walt and walt and wait for events 
to develop to their interest. 
During the past 10 or 11 years I have 
as one Senator, made a number of sug-
gestions to our government as to what 
might or might not be done to stabilize 
the situation In South Viet Nam, In all 
Viet Narn, and also in Cambodia and 
Laos. The possibilities of fw·ther 
initiatives for peace become slimmer by 
the day, even as the alternatives become 
more restricted by the hour. 
I would like to suggest once again, 
therefore, that the co-chairmen of the 
Geneva Conference of 1961, that is the 
Soviet UnJon and Great Britain, jointly 
reconvene the conference for the pur-
pose of discussing the affairs of Laos, 
Cambodia, South Viet Nam and North 
Viet Narn to the end that all reasonable 
and honorable possibllities of peace and 
Integrated economic reconstruction and 
development In the area may be Investi-
gated. 
If It is not possible to call a conference 
covering all of the nations of Indochina, 
then I would suggest again that the two 
co-chairmen reconvene the Geneva Con-
ference along the lines requested by 
Prince Norodom Sihanouk for the pur-
pose of considering ways and means by 
which the Geneva signatories may at 
least guarantee Cambodia's Independ-
ence and territorial integrity and this 
matter only. If Cambodia can be In-
sulated from the growing conflict, that, 
in Itself, would be a highly significant 
achievement for peace In Indo-China 
and Southeast Asia. 
But I must say in all frankness, at this 
time, that a conference based on the con-
sideration of the entire question and 
called by the co-chairmen would appear 
to me to be a more desirable alternative. 
I want to be clear, however, that If such 
a conference is not possible or feasible 
at this time, then I believe it is still 
desirable that a conference on Cam-
bodia alone under the authority of the 
co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference 
of 1961 should be called. 
There has long been a desire for such 
a conference on the part of Prince 
S!hanouk. He made his position on this 
question very clear some weeks ago In 
a letter to the New York Times and I 
ask unanimous consent that Its text may 
be Included at the end of my remarks. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without 
objection, it Is so ordered 
<See exhibit No 2.) 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President. to-
day, there are reports on the news ticker 
that Pnnce Souvanna Phouma of Laos 
has urged Britaln to a.rrange a reconven-
Ing of the Geneva conference. In thJs 
connection I ask unanimous consent that 
the report referred to also be printed at 
the end of my remarks. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER Without 
objection, 1t is so ordered 
<See exhibit 3 .) 
Mr MANSFIELD Mr President, 
finally, I would suggest that !l there !s 
reluctance or reservations or inabilities 
on the part of one of the cochairmen of 
the Geneva grouping of 1961, then In 
view of the gravity of the Situation. the 
other would appear to me to be eminently 
justified in issuing the call for a recon-
vening of the conference on Its own. The 
Geneva agreement of 1961 clearly pro-
vides for consultations when there are 
difficulties. It would, therefore, be en-
tirely In order, In the light of the great 
difficulties at this time, for any partici-
pating nation, and particularly, one of 
the cochairmen to issue the call. I do 
not see how any State which recognizes 
the urgent necessity for peace and has 
eyes to see where the present course !n 
Vietnam is tending, can refuse to heed 
to call for a meeting of thJs kind. But 
In any event, there would still be some 
opportunity for the others to make a 
contribution to the restoration of peace 
if the conference is convened. 
Perhaps the hour is late, but the old 
saying "better late than never" applies 
here and it applies with the greatest of 
force. 
I thank the distinguished Senator 
from Wisconsin [Mr. PROXMIRE) for his 
patience and consideration in yielding 
to me. 
EXHIBIT 1 
[From the Washington (D.C.) Dally News, 
JUly 20. 1965 I 
GENERAL KY WANTS To "REORGANIZE THE 
R£Aa": WINNING VIETNAM WAR Is GoiNG 
To BE OI's Jos 
(By R. H. Shack!ord) 
It Is becoming more obvious each day that 
I! the wa.r In VIetnam Is to be won---<>r even 
brought to a stalemate--American GI's a.re 
going to have to do the bUlk of the Job. 
Each day brlngs further evidence that the 
South VIetnamese a.re in a bad way, mlll-
tarlly and pol!tlcally. The unthinkable o! a 
few months ago--VIetnam becoming an 
American wa.r-ls now routinely accepted 
here. 
South VIetnamese Prernler Gen. Nguyen 
Cll() Ky has virtually admitted that the 
Americans will have to play a bigger and big-
ger role In the war Lf It Is to go on. 
He Ls the same man who talks with bravado 
about "l!berating" North VIetnam while con-
ceding that be cannot "l!berate" th·e south. 
General Ky Ls the flamboyant, high l!ving 
chief of the VIetnamese Air Force who. !or a. 
month, bas been the latest or a long line of 
unsuccessful Premiers. 
He appeared over the weekend on a. na-
tionwide U.S. television show and gave some 
disturbing Information about the sta tu.e of 
his country. 
First, General Ky conceded that the people 
o! South VIetnam a.re "Indifferent" about the 
wa.r. Many. be admitted, will not partici-
pate Ln the wa.r eltort because they are dis-
gusted with the continuous changes In gov-
ernment Ln Saigon and, t.bus, have no con.l\-
dence Ln any government. 
Second, be promised more confusion 
among the VIetnamese military and govern-
ment hierarchy by pn>mlalng a.n tb~ 
thorough purge o1 both 
Tb.Ls would be t.he umpt.eont.h " pur ~ .. Ln 
the la.st 2 years- the Vletcon& gainln iJ'ound 
on each one. 
Thlrd more Amerlca.n ora ~ nC«<~ . he 
aald, so that the bUill: of the South VIet-
namese Army could ··reorga.nlze \.he rear." 
He sugge6Led thM US. troope hold " Ule 
perlmeter"-apparently meaning do the 
tlghtlng against the VIetcong. 
The Ky TV lntenlew wu bTOA.dcaat In t.he 
United States while Deren e Secretary Rob-
ert McNam.ru-a was In Vletna.m. rocel,lng p-
peals from General Ky and U.S m.lllta.ry om-
clals there tor more American ground rorct'S 
Mr. McNamara's Saigon trip appeared pri-
marily to be a well-staged operation for pre-
paring the American people tor more bad 
new&--because the decision to send more 
American troops to VIetnam wu made long 
before Mr. McNamara. lett the United States 
last week 
The United States now bas more than 
75,000 uniformed men In VIetnam, plus an-
other 20,000 olt the shorea or that country 
wl ,b the 7th Fleet. 
The Joint Chiefs of Stat!' are understood 
to have recommended that the United States 
plan to have 179,000 men on the ground In 
VIetnam by the end of the year. 
General Ky came closer to disclosing the 
dire outlook In Vletnant than any U 8 otllclo.l 
President Johnson has said the situation 
wLII get worse before It gets better. But no 
U.S . otllclal bas even hinted, as General Ky 
did, that tbe war Is eo cl06e to becoming 
overwhelmingly an American war 
The VIetnamese manpower situation long 
bas been deficient. For years there have 
been brave promises ot major recruiting and 
conscripting-but each campaign has fallen 
short of goals. 
The South VIetnamese M!Htary Establish-
ment usually Is said to total 550,000 men 
Less frequently It Is explained that only 
250,000 or those are Regular Army soldiers, 
the rest being various paramilitary units 
ranging all the way down to policemen 
The " numbers game·• on the VIetcong goes 
on. Last week they were said to have 65 ,000 
regUlars. supported by 80,000 to 100.000 
Irregulars or part-time euerrlllas. 
U.S. otllclals claim that the rate of Infiltra-
tion !rom the north, Including Regular North 
VIetnamese Army nnlt.s , has Increased rap-
Idly In recent months. Major "search and 
kill" operations, however, have !ailed so far 
to flush any large enemy groups !or combat 
In the Jungles. 
In justifying the huge Increase or U.S. 
ground forces In VIetnam and the plans !or 
more, the United States emphasizes primar-
Ily the larger numbers Invading !rom the 
north. 
General Ky was the first to Indicate--how-
ever Indirectly-that another major reason 
tor needing more GI'a Ia the disintegration 
In the south. 
ExHmrr 2 
SmANOUK DIScussES CAMBODIAN CoNFutENCE 
To the Eorroa : 
In your May 6 editorial (Internal ed.IUon 
May 7) you analyze the reasons which Im-
pelled Cambodia to sever diplomatic relations 
with the United States. 
You write that this decision stemmed rrom 
my convictions that I could avoid v868alage 
to China. by paying occasional " political 
tribute." A little further you say that I try 
to avoid Chinese Interference In my country 
by making conceealons to China In foreign 
atl'alrs. 
You attribute to me sentiments, that are 
not at all m.lne, a.nd thua you create 1m un-
fortunate contusion In the minds of your 
readers 
Last month I wrote in the monthly review 
Knmbuja published In Pnompenh. I have 
never had the allgheat Illusion on the tate 
that nwalts me at the ha.nct. of the Commu-
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nlata, a.a well as that which Is reeerved tor my 
government, atter having removed trom our 
region the In!! uence e.nd especially the pres-
ence ot the tree world, and the United States 
In particular. 
In an editorial which will appear shortly In 
this same review, I concede again that atter 
the disappearance ot the United States !rom 
our region and the victory ot the Communist 
camp, I myself and the people's Socialist 
community that I have created would In-
evitably disappear !rom the scene. 
I know the Chinese well enough to under-
stand that they cannot be bought and that It 
Is perfectly useless to bend before them, or 
to play their game occa.sslonally In the hope 
ot extracting some ulterior advantage. U I 
acted thus, I would be despised, and rightly 
so, by the Chinese people, who would not 
alter their plans one Iota so tar as my coun-
try Ia concerned. 
But there Is one thing that you Americans 
seem Incapable ot understanding. And that 
Ia that Cambodia has broken off with the 
United States ot America not because It Is 
a "pawn ot Pelplhg," as you write, but tor 
reasons ot dignity and national honor that 
we have • • • placed on Cambodia, you dis-
play obvious spite In saying that the tault 
ls mine and that because I allow myselt to 
by "maneuvered by Pelplng," the meeting 
may not take place. 
As tor the prospect ot an International 
conference taking place on Cambodia, you let 
It be known that the tault lies with me 
because I allow myself "to be run by Pelplng," 
that the meeting wlll not take place. 
But then you Immediately point out that 
this conference was Intended "In part to pro-
vide a way tor exploratory conversations on 
Vietnam." And this Is repeated and em-
ulated by all press ot the tree world. We 
Cambodians have come to the conclusion 
that the neutrality ot Cambodia and our ter-
ritorial Integrity do not concern you at all 
and that this conference Is simply, In your 
eyes, a good way to sound out the ultimate 
Intentions ot the VIetnamese and tl.e Chln~se 
ln regard to South VIetnam and that you wlll 
link our problem to that ot VIetnam. by re-
fusing to give any guarantee whatever to 
Cambodia I! the Communists remain In-
transigent on Vietnam. 
The People's Republic ot China, the Soviet 
Union, and the Democratic Republic ot 
VIetnam have stated clearly their determina-
tion not to accept the government ot Saigon 
as partner In an International meeting. 
We, ourselves, are well aware that the gov-
ernment ot Saigon has lost control ot almost 
!our-tl!ths ot the Vietnamese border with 
Cambodia, and we are also aware ot the tact 
that Saigon persists In claiming the coastal 
Khmeres Islands, while the National Libera-
tion Front ot South Vietnam and Hanoi 
acknowledge our ownership 
Nevertheless-and In an effort to arrive at 
a solution In such a dtmcult context-! ad-
vised the British Prime Minister Harold Wil-
son, who had sent me on May 11 an urgent 
message, that Cambodia would accept the 
conference on two conditions: 
First ot all, that the conference should 
concern ltsel! with the Cambodian problem 
to the exclus ion ot the Vietnamese or Lao-
tian problem. Then, that the Interested 
powers: Great Britain, U.S.S R., the United 
States, France, and the People's Republic ot 
China, should agree In advance on a solution 
which would satlsty all, on the problem ot 
the representation ot South VIetnam. 
I pointed out to Mr. Wilson that there 
were tour posslbllltles: ( 1) that South Viet-
nam should not be rep-esented at the con-
ference; (2) or shoutd be represented by the 
National Liberation Front; (3) or be repre-
sented by the Government of Saigon; (4) 
or finally be represented bilaterally: one seat 
to the NLF, which Is supported by the So-
cialist camp, and another seat to the Gov-
ernment or Saigon, which Ia backed by the 
tree worl<t. 
I Informed the British Prime Minister that 
Ca.mbodla stands rea.dy In advance to accept 
whatever solution regarding the rep.-esenta-
tlon or South VIetnam would be mutually 
approved by the great powers or the East and 
the West. 
This w111 prove to you, I hope, that we are 
=ot the puppets or Pelplng and that we do 
not put "spokes In any wheels" In order to 
defeat a project that the United States has 
put so long on "Ice" e.nd which now they 
discover has so many merits. 
NORODOM SIHANOUK, 
Head of State of Cambodia. 
PNOMPENH, May 16, 1965. 
ExHmrrS 
LoNDON.-Premler Prince Souvanna Pho-
uma ot Laos urged Prime MJ..n.l.&ter Harold 
Wilson today to help arrange new Interna-
tional talks on Indochina to negotiate !or 
peace In Vietnam. 
The neutralist Laotian leader, here on a 2-
day omctal visit, met Wilson and other 
British Ministers at lunch In 10 Downing 
Street. 
Dlploma.ts reported Souva.nna stressed that 
so long as the Vietnam war goes on the se-
curity ot nea.rby Laos and Cambodia will 
remain In jeopardy. 
North Vietnamese supply lines to the VIet-
cong In the south run through Laotian ter-
ritory controlled by the Red-led Pathet Lao. 
This has attracted U.S. bomber attacks on 
Laotian territory bordering South VIetnam. 
Informants said Souvanna, noting the 
tatlure or all efforts to date to bring abOut 
a. VIetnam peace parley, suggested the 
British and Soviet cochairmen reconvene the 
1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina. This 
dealt with Vletna.rn, Cambodia, and Laos In 
separate settlements. Souvanna, who con-
ferred In Paris yesterday with President 
Charles de Gaulle, claimed French backing 
tor !lis Idea. 
W llson &.lld Foreign Secretary Michael 
Stewart were sympathetic to Souva.nna's sug-
gestion but were doubtful whether It would 
prove to be effective, the sources said. 
July 21, 1965 
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